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INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF FOOD
SAFETY STANDARDS: THE ROLE OF
DOMESTIC CERTIFIERS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
REZGAR MOHAMMED
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas
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Abstract. We examined the cross-national adoption of six major private food
safety standards, focusing on the role of certifiers and international trade. Results
show that the number of certification bodies existing in the domestic country,
food exports, and the proportion of food exports to North America had positive
effects on a country’s adoption of food safety standards. Distance leads to product
differentiation for the standards and therefore disadvantages developing countries
in Africa and Asia for adopting the standards, which are all based in the United
States or Europe. Providing these countries with better access to certifiers can
alleviate this geographic disadvantage.
Keywords. Adoption, certification bodies, food exports, food safety standard,
private food standard, third-party certification
JEL Classifications:.Q13, Q17, Q18
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Food safety breaches can cause significant economic losses to producers, sickness
to consumers, diminished consumer confidence in the safety of the food supply,
and widespread social distress. In 2014 alone, the United States had 94 recalls
of meat and poultry and 491 recalls of other food products, up from 53 and
225 in 2005, respectively, exposing our weakness in the food safety net.1 Private
food safety certification has emerged as a prominent and influential regulatory
The authors thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their helpful comments
and suggestions. Any remaining errors are the authors’.
∗Corresponding author’s e-mail: yuqing.zheng@uky.edu
1 Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service (2015) and the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (2015).
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Diffusion of Food Safety Standards 297
mechanism in both the private (e.g., requirement imposed on suppliers by major
retailers) and public spheres (e.g., the new Food Safety Modernization Act’s
[FSMA] requirement on importers) of the contemporary agrifood system.
The certification process starts with a producer (farmer or food manufacturer)
choosing a food safety standard out of its own interest or as a requirement
of government or buyers (e.g., retailers or importers). The major private food
safety standards recognized by the Global Food Safety Initiative, an important
international benchmarking institution, are British Retail Consortium Food
Standard (BRC), Food Safety System Certification 22000 (FSSC 22000), Global
Good Agricultural Practices (GlobalGAP), International Featured Standards
Foods (IFS), International Organization for Standardization 22000 (ISO 22000),
PrimusGFS (developed by PrimusLab as a Global Food Safety Initiative variant),
and Safe Quality Food (SQF). After deciding on the standard, the producer
chooses an accredited third-party certifier (also known as a certification body)
under that standard that will conduct an audit.
Certification bodies are private firms (for profit or nonprofit) that hire
certifiers/auditors to offer independent verification that the producers meet the
requirements of a certain standard. To be able to offer food safety certification,
a certification body will need to apply to the standard holder, get accredited, and
train qualified auditors. In general, qualified auditors should have an appropriate
higher education, audit and work experience (about 5 years), and complete
training in the specified standard that usually has a time requirement such as a
few days.2 For example, BRC offers a 2-day course frequently for auditor training
in many locations in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and Chile.
The cost is around US$1,000. Some certification bodies focus on food safety
certification, whereas most others offer a wider variety of certifications such
as general quality management system (ISO 9001). In 2011, the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) estimated there were about 568 certification bodies
worldwide offering food safety audits. It is also worth noting that a certification
body can offer certification to several food safety standards and can choose to
offer different standards in different countries.3 Finally, after going through an
auditing process, the producer needs to fix nonconformities identified by the
certification body in order to get certified. Certification needs to be renewed on
a regular basis (normally 1 year).
The aim of this article is to examine cross-national adoption of private food
safety standards, focusing on the role of certifiers and international trade. The
cost of obtaining certification largely consists of auditing fees (usually billed by
2 Source: BRC website, “How to Become a BRC Global Standards Auditor,” http://www.
brcglobalstandards.com/partners/certification-bodies/how-to-become-a-brc-global-standards-auditor/
(accessed March 1, 2017).
3 For example, Bureau Veritas, a leading international certification body headquartered in France,
offers certification to six and three of the aforementioned food safety standards in North America and
China, respectively.
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hour), preparation and compliance cost, and auditors’ travel expenses. Although
normally the smallest cost of the three, travel cost can be cumbersome especially
to developing countries. For example, suppliers in developing countries who
are seeking certification sometimes have to pay for travel and living expenses
of certifiers from industrialized nations (Barrett et al., 2002). In Ghana, most
growers seeking third-party food safety certification are required to bring in
certifiers from Europe (Hatanaka, Bain, and Busch, 2005). As mentioned by
Barrett et al. (2002), the likelihood of adopting certificates might increase with
the existence of a local auditor.4 In fact, Herzfeld, Drescher, and Grebitus (2011)
showed that the existence of a domestic certification body had a significant
impact on the cross-national adoption of both GlobalGAP and BRC certificates.
In this article, we aim to further quantify how the number of certification bodies
existing in the domestic country and the distance to the standard holder’s country
affect a country’s adoption of the major food safety standards.
Our analysis of the relationship between trade and certification adoption fits
in the broad literature of food attributes. The main strand of this literature
evaluates how consumers value various food attributes such as organics (e.g.,
McCluskey and Loureiro, 2003; Meas et al., 2015), genetically modified
organisms (e.g., Liaukonyte et al., 2013), country of origin (e.g., Lim et al.,
2014; Loureiro and Umberger, 2007), and recombinant bovine somatotropin
(rbST)–free milk (e.g., Kanter, Messer, and Kaiser, 2009; Runge and Jackson,
2000). Another strand of this literature focuses on how food attributes (or
requirements on attributes) could affect producers and trade. For example, many
studies empirically examined how food safety requirements (e.g., sanitary and
phytosanitary measures and maximum residual limit) can affect food imports
(e.g., Jongwanich, 2009; Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh, 2001a, 2001b; Peterson
et al., 2013). Several studies examined the impact of food safety standards on
producers’ levels of production or revenues by focusing on the GlobalGAP
standard and using data from developing countries. For example, Henson,
Masakure, and Cranfield (2011) found that GlobalGAP certification had a
positive effect on firm export sales performance for the fresh produce industry in
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Other examples include Asfaw, Mithöfer, and
Waibel (2009, 2010) and Kariuki, Loy, and Herzfeld (2012) for Kenya, Subervie
and Vagneron (2013) for Madagascar, and Holzapfel and Wollni (2014) for
Thailand.
It is worth noting that the number and size of food safety certified sites have
been ignored in the aforementioned literature. One purpose of our study is to
highlight this aspect of this often neglected issue, by focusing on the relationship
between the number of food safety certified sites and food trade.On one hand, the
4 For example, China has about 40 certification bodies that offer food safety certifications, with most
being domestic and a handful of international ones such as Intertek and DNV. In the last decade, China
has experienced a large increase in the number of sites certified to food safety standards.
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number of food safety certified sites might enhance food exports by improving
the level of food safety. Two studies that examined how certification affects food
exports include Henson, Masakure, and Cranfield (2011) and Zheng, Muth,
and Brophy (2013). In particular, Zheng, Muth, and Brophy (2013) found that
China’s aggregate food exports to the United States were positively associated
with the number of BRC, GlobalGAP, or ISO 22000 certified sites in China.
On the other hand, trade and trade relationship might spur further adoption
of certification. A food export–oriented economy could have a higher demand
for food safety certification in order to maintain/strengthen the competitive
advantage in international market. A country with a close trade relationship with
Europe generally will have a higher demand for the standards that are popular
in Europe as well. We will address the important, but yet unanswered, question
of whether the international relationship of food trade affects the adoption
of a country’s food safety certification. In particular, because the food safety
certification requirement has been imposed by many developed countries on
suppliers in developing countries,we hypothesize that a country’s food exports to
the European Union and/or North America would positively affect the adoption
of food safety certification. Suppliers in developing countries may also have
voluntarily used certification to gain market access to developed countries. In
addition, we also explore whether a higher export share of more perishable food
will result in a higher demand for certification.
Our study builds on Herzfeld, Drescher, and Grebitus’s (2011) study of
cross-national adoption of GlobalGAP and BRC standards but extends the
analysis in three significant ways. First, our sample size is much larger by
covering all the aforementioned food safety standards except IFS (IFS does not
publicly disclose information on certified sites). Second, we use the number of
certification bodies present in the domestic country rather than the presence
of a domestic certification body for a standard, allowing us to quantify the
impact of adding an additional certification body. Third, by including a country’s
food exports to each continent and a breakdown of food exports by type,
we specifically model the impact of trade relations on the diffusion of food
safety standards. We found that an increase of one domestic certification body
increased the number of certified sites by 3.9, highlighting the importance of
providing easy access to trained auditors in developing countries. Furthermore,
a country’s adoption of certification is negatively related to the distance to the
standard holder’s country (where the standard originated from), and positively
affected by total food exports and by the proportion of food exported to North
America.
1.2. Adoption and Distribution of Standards by Country
In Table 1, we included the number of certified sites to each standard (except
IFS, for which we do not have data) broken down by country for the year of
2013. Note that because a producer can have multiple sites certified to the same
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Table 1. Certified Sites by Country and Standard, 2013
Country BRC
FSSC
22000 GlobalGAP
ISO
22000 PrimusGFS SQF
HHI across
Standards
Afghanistan 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Albania 1 0 0 7 0 0 0.78
Algeria 0 3 0 11 0 0 0.66
Argentina 108 112 880 117 2 0 0.55
Armenia 2 1 1 11 0 0 0.56
Australia 286 94 117 143 0 869 0.39
Austria 59 85 2,619 72 0 0 0.86
Azerbaijan 2 3 1 9 0 0 0.42
Bahamas 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Barbados 0 2 0 0 0 0 1
Belarus 7 15 0 14 0 0 0.36
Belgium 585 116 3,185 200 0 0 0.63
Belize 1 0 0 0 9 0 0.82
Benin 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA
Bolivia 1 10 2 25 0 0 0.51
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
2 6 204 17 0 0 0.8
Botswana 2 1 0 1 0 0 0.38
Brazil 116 237 1,146 198 0 4 0.49
Brunei 0 1 0 3 0 0 0.63
Bulgaria 29 80 26 244 0 0 0.47
Burkina Faso 0 0 170 0 0 0 1
Burundi 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA
Cambodia 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.5
Canada 473 222 33 54 162 546 0.27
Central African
Republic
0 0 0 0 0 0 NA
Chile 225 29 3,195 85 8 2 0.82
China 1,738 775 291 9,406 0 6 0.62
Colombia 11 24 724 58 0 2 0.79
Congo, Republic of 0 1 0 7 0 0 0.78
Costa Rica 17 40 314 9 0 6 0.68
Côte D’Ivoire 8 5 686 0 0 0 0.96
Croatia 14 36 130 97 0 0 0.36
Cyprus 26 4 1,111 143 0 0 0.76
Czech Republic 137 96 97 159 0 0 0.26
Denmark 148 60 269 155 0 0 0.31
Dominican
Republic
1 6 993 3 2 1 0.97
Ecuador 30 17 926 26 0 5 0.85
Egypt 160 33 772 296 0 0 0.45
El Salvador 2 5 0 10 0 1 0.4
Estonia 11 2 1 22 0 0 0.47
Ethiopia 7 0 18 23 0 0 0.39
Fiji 0 3 1 4 0 6 0.32
Finland 33 49 0 117 0 0 0.43
Gambia 1 0 2 0 0 0 0.56
Georgia 1 3 2 16 0 0 0.56
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Table 1. Continued
Country BRC
FSSC
22000 GlobalGAP
ISO
22000 PrimusGFS SQF
HHI across
Standards
Germany 603 299 9,008 352 0 0 0.78
Ghana 13 2 134 5 0 0 0.77
Greece 264 90 11,367 1,720 0 0 0.73
Guatemala 13 20 1,652 19 3 5 0.93
Hong Kong, China 2 4 0 82 0 0 0.87
Hungary 121 46 1,279 137 0 0 0.67
Iceland 14 2 1 2 0 0 0.57
India 481 491 6,225 1,489 0 15 0.55
Indonesia 94 109 5 262 0 4 0.4
Iraq 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Ireland 381 22 55 42 0 0 0.6
Israel 174 35 1,258 108 0 0 0.66
Italy 2,328 156 20,218 781 0 0 0.75
Jamaica 0 6 4 1 0 0 0.44
Japan 7 701 227 825 0 294 0.31
Jordan 9 3 19 38 0 0 0.4
Kazakhstan 0 6 0 9 0 0 0.52
Kenya 40 28 2,326 101 0 0 0.87
Kiribati 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.5
Kuwait 4 3 0 22 0 0 0.61
Kyrgyzstan 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Latvia 15 0 4 36 0 0 0.51
Lebanon 3 0 34 73 0 0 0.54
Lithuania 49 12 5 42 0 0 0.37
Luxembourg 9 2 0 9 0 0 0.42
Macedonia 2 14 23 0 0 0 0.48
Madagascar 2 3 435 1 0 0 0.97
Malawi 0 6 0 6 0 0 0.5
Malaysia 42 81 15 389 0 1 0.57
Maldives 7 1 0 27 0 0 0.64
Malta 5 2 47 4 0 0 0.67
Mauritania 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Mauritius 13 3 3 17 0 0 0.37
Mexico 91 353 669 133 3,402 178 0.52
Moldova 0 4 2 57 0 0 0.82
Mongolia 0 2 0 2 0 0 0.5
Morocco 116 16 717 52 0 0 0.65
Mozambique 1 4 2 5 0 0 0.32
Namibia 5 0 35 3 0 0 0.68
Nepal 0 3 0 6 0 0 0.56
Netherlands 1,312 367 8,625 375 0 0 0.67
New Zealand 226 45 1,417 21 0 19 0.69
Nicaragua 5 7 4 7 0 0 0.26
Niger 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA
Nigeria 2 23 0 8 0 0 0.55
Norway 103 35 51 54 0 0 0.29
Oman 5 1 2 11 0 0 0.42
Pakistan 34 56 172 75 0 0 0.35
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Table 1. Continued
Country BRC
FSSC
22000 GlobalGAP
ISO
22000 PrimusGFS SQF
HHI across
Standards
Panama 2 4 41 2 0 0 0.71
Paraguay 5 4 0 3 0 0 0.35
Peru 97 27 6,462 8 0 14 0.96
Philippines 36 76 9 63 0 0 0.33
Poland 796 110 3,163 640 0 0 0.5
Portugal 130 22 913 192 0 0 0.56
Qatar 0 1 0 11 0 0 0.85
Romania 51 153 66 1,014 0 0 0.64
Russian Federation 74 263 1 279 0 0 0.4
Rwanda 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Samoa 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
São Tomé and
Príncipe
0 0 0 0 0 0 NA
Saudi Arabia 31 15 6 138 0 0 0.56
Senegal 4 1 290 0 0 0 0.97
Singapore 12 28 0 100 0 1 0.55
Slovakia 36 25 22 123 0 0 0.41
Slovenia 10 9 50 19 0 0 0.39
Solomon Islands 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
South Africa 224 259 2,050 260 0 0 0.56
South Korea 6 132 292 127 0 41 0.34
Spain 1,551 164 32,149 525 0 0 0.88
Sri Lanka 51 35 5 301 0 0 0.61
Sweden 215 129 17 56 0 0 0.38
Switzerland 223 183 59 224 0 0 0.29
Tanzania 7 6 212 5 0 0 0.85
Thailand 426 114 107 278 0 14 0.32
Togo 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Tunisia 9 18 184 98 0 0 0.46
Turkey 537 147 2,133 733 0 0 0.43
Uganda 2 3 13 15 0 0 0.37
Ukraine 9 98 3 173 0 0 0.49
United Kingdom 3,786 76 80 82 0 0 0.89
United States 1,833 951 1,611 157 8,720 4,354 0.33
Uruguay 27 11 40 18 0 0 0.3
Venezuela 0 13 0 5 0 1 0.54
Vietnam 243 47 323 311 0 0 0.31
Zambia 1 5 3 7 0 0 0.33
Zimbabwe 5 6 48 8 0 0 0.54
HHI across
countries
0.07 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.58 0.49
Notes: HHI across standards is the Herfindal concentration index across the six standards for a country
(i.e., horizontal calculation in the table). HHI across countries is the Herfindal concentration index across
all countries for a standard (i.e., vertical calculation in the table). BRC, British Retail Consortium Food
Standard; FSSC 22000, Food Safety System Certification 22000; GlobalGAP, Global Good Agricultural
Practices; IFS, International Featured Standards Foods; ISO 22000, International Organization for
Standardization 22000; NA, not available; PrimusGFS, developed by PrimusLab as a Global Food Safety
Initiative variant; SQF, Safe Quality Food.
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standard or different standards, adding up the numbers for a country does not
yield the number of certified producers. Table 1 shows that for a given country,
the number of certified sites to the farming exclusive GlobalGAP standard is
normally several times larger than that to any other standard. There is also a huge
difference in the numbers of certified sites across countries, with such gaps being
particularly large between developing and developed countries. In the last column
of the table, we also reported the Herfindal concentration index across the six
standards (HHI across standards) for a country (i.e., horizontal calculation in
the table). This HHI measures the distribution of standards within a country.
Similarly, we report in the last row the HHI across all countries for a standard
(i.e., vertical calculation in the table, HHI across countries), measuring the
distribution of sites across countries for a standard. For example, the HHI across
standards is 0.62 and 0.33 for China and the United States, respectively. These
numbers reflect the fact that for China, ISO 22000 accounted for most of the
certified sites, and for the United States, two U.S.-based standards (PrimusGFS
and SQF) led the certification numbers together. The HHI across countries also
indicates that the two U.S.-based standards are much more concentrated (HHI
equals 0.58 and 0.49) than the rest of the four standards (HHI equals 0.07, 0.04,
0.10, and 0.16).
In Table 2, we included the top 10 countries for each standard. We also
plotted in Figure 1 the distribution of certified sites, with one world map for
each standard. Several patterns emerge from the data by looking at the two
tables and the map. First, standards have very different geographic coverage,
with some primarily being adopted by their own and surrounding countries,
whereas some others enjoying much wider international adoption. For example,
almost all of the top three countries adopting the two U.S.-based standards are
in North America. Similarly, United Kingdom is the top country adopting the
BRC standard, which is a British standard. The other three standards are also
Europe-based standards as the headquarters of FSSC 22000, GlobalGAP, and
ISO 22000 are located in Netherlands, France, and Switzerland, respectively.5
However, FSSC 22000 and ISO 22000 are widely adopted by countries outside
Europe such as the United States, China, and India. Overall, the figures show
that European countries had the highest numbers of certificates for the four
European standards, whereas Africa and South America tended to have the
lowest numbers for any standard. Second, producers within the same country can
have a disperse attraction for different standards. This is evident by observing
many countries, such as the United States, China, India, Poland, and Japan,
that appear in the top 10 lists for multiple standards in the table. Third, many
countries, especially countries with limited numbers of certified sites, tend to
focus on one standard. This is the case for countries such as Algeria, Kuwait, and
Zimbabwe.
5 IFS is a Germany-based standard.
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Table 2. Top Ten Countries by the Number of Certified Sites, 2013
Country BRC Country
FSSC
22000 Country GlobalGAP Country
ISO
22000 Country PrimusGFS Country SQF
United Kingdom 3,786 United States 951 Spain 32,149 China 9,406 United States 8,720 United States 4,354
Italy 2,328 China 775 Italy 20,218 Greece 1,720 Mexico 3,402 Australia 869
United States 1,833 Japan 701 Greece 11,367 India 1,489 Canada 162 Canada 546
China 1,738 India 491 Germany 9,008 Romania 1,014 Belize 9 Japan 294
Spain 1,551 Netherlands 367 Netherlands 8,625 Japan 825 Chile 8 Mexico 178
Netherlands 1,312 Mexico 353 Peru 6,462 Italy 781 Guatemala 3 South Korea 41
Poland 796 Germany 299 India 6,225 Turkey 733 Dominican Republic 2 New Zealand 19
Germany 603 Russia 263 Chile 3,195 Poland 640 Argentina 2 India 15
Belgium 585 South Africa 259 Belgium 3,185 Spain 525 Austria 0 Peru 14
Turkey 537 Brazil 237 Poland 3,163 Malaysia 389 Portugal 0 Thailand 14
Note: BRC, British Retail Consortium Food Standard; FSSC 22000, Food Safety System Certification 22000; GlobalGAP, Global Good Agricultural Practices;
IFS, International Featured Standards Foods; ISO 22000, International Organization for Standardization 22000; PrimusGFS, developed by PrimusLab as a Global
Food Safety Initiative variant; SQF, Safe Quality Food.
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Figure 1. Maps of Certified Sites by Country and Standard (year = 2013;
BRC, British Retail Consortium Food Standard; FSSC 22000, Food Safety
System Certification 22000; GlobalGAP, Global Good Agricultural Practices;
ISO 22000, International Organization for Standardization 22000; PrimusGFS,
developed by PrimusLab as a Global Food Safety Initiative variant; SQF, Safe
Quality Food)
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Figure 1. Continued
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One might wonder what reasons could explain the lack of certified sites
and what impact this might have on a country’s ability to export. The first
question becomes the focus of this article. Potential reasons include economic
constraints such as less economic development, lack of a middle class that
accounts for domestic demand for certification, access barrier to certifiers (note
that standards are freely available for downloading), and lack of demand for
traded products. Exporting a small share of food exports or exporting a small
share of food exports to countries with a high demand for safety certification
(generally developed countries) can cause a lack of demand for certification. As
to the second question, a lack of certified sites may make a country’s food exports
less attractive to developed countries.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 describe the
model and data we used, respectively. Section 4 presents the results, and Section
5 contains some concluding remarks.
2. A Model of Certification Adoption
We model each country’s certified sites to a standard as the dependent
variable (the numbers presented in Table 1). Two commonly used models for
count data, the Poisson model and the negative binomial model, suit our
needs well. However, one major shortcoming of the Poisson model is that it
assumes the variance of the dependent variable equals its mean. The negative
binomial model subsumes the Poisson model, does not impose the equidispersion
assumption, and allows for a test of the assumption (Greene 2012). Therefore,
following Herzfeld, Drescher, and Grebitus’s (2011) study, we adopt a negative
binomial model and will conduct a test on the equidispersion assumption. The
summary statistics in Table 3 show a mean of 162.44 and a standard deviation
of 479.64 for the dependent variable, providing some justification for our
choice.
Our model is specified as follows:
E(yic|xic) = exp(x′β + eic), (1)
where i (i = 1, …, 6) indexes the six standards in Table 1, c indexes country, yic
is the number of sites in country c certified to standard i, x′β are explanatory
variables to be defined, and eic is the error term. The probability mass function
is
Pr(Yic = yic|xic, α) =

(
α−1 + yic
)

(
α−1
)
yic!
(
α−1
α−1 + exp (x′β )
)α−1(
exp (x′β )
α−1 + exp (x′β )
)yic
,
(2)
where α, the overdispersion parameter to be estimated, serves as a formal test of
overdispersion in the data. The conditional variance is
Var(yic|xic) = exp(x′β )[1 + α exp(x′β )]. (3)
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Table 3. Definitions and Summary Statistics of Variables
Variables Definition Source Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
y Number of sites certified to BRC Standard’s website 162.44 479.64 0 3,786.00
Number of sites certified to FSSC
22000
Standard’s website 63.98 141.91 0 951.00
Number of sites certified to
GlobalGAP
Communications with
GlobalGAP
1,025.25 3,659.99 0 32,149.00
Number of sites certified to ISO
22000
ISO Survey of
Certifications
191.97 850.13 0 9,406.00
Number of sites certified to
PrimusGFS
Standard’s website 93.95 815.63 0 8,720.00
Number of sites certified to SQF Standard’s website 48.78 390.46 0 4,354.00
CB Number of BRC certification bodies Standard’s website;
web search
3.40 5.56 0 30.00
Number of FSSC certification bodies Standard’s website;
web search
0.79 1.90 0 10.00
Number of GlobalGAP certification
bodies
Standard’s website;
web search
0.98 2.79 0 19.00
Number of ISO 22000 certification
bodies
Standard’s website;
web search
1.28 3.12 0 21.00
Number of PrimusGFS certification
bodies
Standard’s website;
web search
0.05 0.44 0 5.00
Number of SQF certification bodies Standard’s website;
web search
0.06 0.48 0 5.00
Dist Distance to standard holder
(1,000 km)
CEPII 6.80 4.12 0.08 19.26
GDP Per capita GDP ($1,000, 2005 US$) World Development
Index
12.41 16.63 0.16 79.53
Exp_EU Proportion of food exports to
European Union
UN Comtrade 0.33 0.28 0 0.97
Exp_NA Proportion of food exports to North
America
UN Comtrade 0.11 0.18 0 0.84
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Table 3. Continued
Variables Definition Source Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Exp_SA Proportion of food exports to South
America
UN Comtrade 0.03 0.09 0 0.73
Exp_AS Proportion of food exports to Asia UN Comtrade 0.29 0.28 0 1.00
Exp_AF Proportion of food exports to Africa UN Comtrade 0.12 0.19 0 0.99
Exp_wld Total food exports (million US$) UN Comtrade 7.75 15.47 0 103.07
Exp_meat Proportion of food exports that is
meat
UN Comtrade 0.07 0.11 0 0.71
Exp_fish Proportion of food exports that is fish UN Comtrade 0.16 0.23 0 0.99
Exp_veggie Proportion of food exports that is
vegetables or fruits
UN Comtrade 0.22 0.21 0 0.96
Urban Proportion of populating living in
urban areas
World Development
Index
0.60 0.23 0.11 1
Agland Agricultural land (million km2) World Development
Index
0.32 0.78 0.00001 5.15
Language Dummy variable for sharing a
common language
CEPII 0.21 0.41 0 1.00
Colony Dummy variable for being colonized CEPII 0.09 0.28 0 1.00
Contig Dummy variable for sharing border CEPII 0.02 0.14 0 1.00
Landlocked Dummy variable for being a
landlocked country
CEPII 0.21 0.40 0 1.00
Note: BRC, British Retail Consortium Food Standard; CEPII, Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales; FSSC 22000, Food Safety System
Certification 22000; GlobalGAP, Global Good Agricultural Practices; IFS, International Featured Standards Foods; ISO 22000, International Organization for
Standardization 22000; PrimusGFS, developed by PrimusLab as a Global Food Safety Initiative variant; SQF, Safe Quality Food.
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We specify a country’s adoption of certification in the following manner,where
βsi represents parameters, and vector is denoted with bold:
x′β = β0 + β1CBic + β2Distic + β3GDPc + β4Exp−wldc + β5Exp−Destinationc
+β6Exp−Productc + β7Urbanc + β8Aglandc + β9Languageic
+β10Colonyic + β11Contigic + β12Landlockedc + β13Dummyic. (4)
We included three sets of explanatory variables in the model, including core
variables, trade-related variables, and other control variables such as language
and colonial relationship. The first set is three core variables we hypothesize
to determine the adoption of certification: the number of certification bodies
in country c that are accredited to certify to standard i (CBic), the capital-to-
capital distance between country c and the home country of standard i (Distic),
and the per capita gross domestic product of country c (GDPc). The number
of certification bodies is counted at the headquarters level. For example, two
BRC-accredited certification bodies with 5 and 25 respective offices in India
would count as two in our data for India for BRC adoption.Many multinational
certification bodies certify to food safety standards as well as to other nonfood-
related standards. Having multiple offices in a country is common, with some
even reaching more than 100. It is impossible to identify which office offers
food safety certification (some of them are technical labs that conduct testing).
Counting at the headquarters level makes the data much less noisy to the
aforementioned complications.
The second set of variables is related to trade. The variable Exp_wld is a
country’s total food exports ($) to the world. The vector Exp_Destinationc
includes five variables capturing food export destinations: Exp_EU, Exp_NA,
Exp_SA, Exp_AS, and Exp_AF. The five variables represent the proportions
of a country’s food exports to the European Union, North America, South
America, Asia, and Africa. These six variables combined capture the impacts
of the food export size and the destination region on certification adoption.
One motivation for including trade in our model is because private food safety
standards are strictly business-to-business standards. That is, institutional buyers
such as retailers and importers will observe the certification status of suppliers
and use this as a criterion to select suppliers, which can provide producers an
incentive to certify. In most cases, consumers will not be able to tell whether a
product is certified because food safety certification is normally not labeled on
product packages, unlike other product attributes such as organic, non-GMO, or
country-of-origin labeling (COOL).6 The other vector,Exp_Productc (consisting
of Exp_meat, Exp_ f ish, and Exp_veggie), represents the proportions of a
6 Some attributes are required by governments to be posted on the package, such as the COOL in
some countries. However, the COOL requirement for beef and pork products in the United States was
ended in 2015.
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country’s food exports that are meat (meat and meat preparations), fish (fish,
crustaceans, mollusks, and aquatic invertebrates), and vegetables and fruits. We
include the export shares of meat, fish, and vegetables and fruits because these
products are viewed as more vulnerable to contamination and diseases than
other products such as grains and oil.7 A higher proportion of food exports in
meat, fish, or vegetables and fruits might have a higher demand for food safety
certification.
Third, building on the two most related studies, Neumayer and Perkins’s
(2005) work on the cross-national adoption of ISO 9000 certification and
Herzfeld, Drescher, and Grebitus’s (2011) study of cross-national adoption of
GlobalGAP and BRC standards, we include a country’s agricultural land size
(Agland), a dummy variable for sharing a common language with the standard
holder’s country, a dummy variable for being colonized by the standard holder’s
country, a dummy variable for sharing a border with the standard holder’s
country, and another dummy variable for being a landlocked country. These
variables are intended to control for a country’s scope of agriculture and
aquaculture (land and sea fishing endowment), closeness, and adjacency with the
standard holder’s country. For example, being a landlocked country (no domestic
access to a seaport and no endowment in sea fishing) is likely to indicate having
limited trading partners and less economic development, with some of these
effects also being captured by our use of GDP and food export. On the other
hand, being a landlocked country also can provide protection from cheap food
imports and result in a more robust local food system and less use of food safety
certification. Overall, we expect the impact of being landlocked to be negative.
Herzfeld, Drescher, and Grebitus (2011) also tried to control for a country’s
infrastructure by including a measure of road density. However, this variable was
not found to be statistically significant. We also tried including another variable,
the number of Internet users per 100 people, following Neumayer and Perkins’s
(2005) argument that communications matter. However, because the number
of Internet users is highly correlated with GDP, with a correlation of 0.77, the
impact of GDP is not significant when Internet users are included. Finally, we
also included the proportion of the population living in urban area to reflect the
domestic demand from the middle class for food safety certification.8
We have data for 131 countries for the six standards. To increase the predictive
power, we pooled the country over the standards so we have a total sample size
of 786 (in the sense of panel data, country is a cross-sectional observation while
standard is treated as time here). The variableDummyic in equation (4) is a vector
of dummy variables controlling for standard and the continent where country i
7 We thank an anonymous review for making this suggestion.
8 Note that for our model,CBic is a supply-side variable, whereas most other variables such as GDPc
and export variables are demand-side variables.
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is located.9 In Section 4.2, we will examine whether our results are robust to
various ways of grouping standards.
3. Data Description
We combined data from different sources. Table 3 presents the definitions and
summary statistics for the variables used. We present the data for certified sites
and certification bodies by each standard and present the rest of the data at the
aggregate level to preserve space. Data are for the year 2013. For the dependent
variable, we collected the data from personal communications with GlobalGAP,
ISO Survey of Certifications (ISO, 2013), and from standard holders’ websites
for the other four standards. We obtained the number of accredited certification
bodies in each country mainly from the standard holders’ websites augmented
by our own web search.
Table 3 shows that on average, GlobalGAP was the most adopted standard,
followed by a distant second of ISO 22000 and third of BRC. SQF was the
least adopted standard. Note that although the six standards cover all food
products, their coverages at the production stage vary. GlobalGAP is primarily
a farming standard that does not cover the food manufacturing or processing
stage. BRC, FSSC 22000, and ISO 22000 are standards for food manufacturing
and processing (see the Global Food Safety Initiative, 2015). PrimusGFS and SQF
cover both farming and food manufacturing/processing. Therefore, the rank of
farming standards in terms of adoption is GlobalGAP, PrimusGFS, and SQF. The
rank of manufacturing and processing standards is ISO 22000, BRC, PrimusGFS,
FSSC 22000, and SQF.
Data on GDP, urban population, and agricultural land came from the World
Bank’s (2013) World Development Indicators. Data on food exports were
obtained from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, known
as UN Comtrade (2015). UN Comtrade contains detailed import and export
statistics reported by statistical authorities in approximately 200 countries or
areas. The food exports are exports reported by the exporting country under
the Standard International Trade Classification (as reported) code 1, which is
food and live animals. This code covers live animals, meat, dairy products and
eggs, seafood, cereals, vegetables and fruits, sugar products, coffee and tea, and
animal feeds and does not include beverages or tobacco products. Finally, data
on distance, colony, contiguousness, common language, and landlocked status
were fromMayer and Zignago (2011; also known as the CEPII [Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales] GeoDist data). After merging the
data, we have observations for 131 countries for all the six standards.
9 Using country dummies will exhaust the degrees of freedom. Using the continent dummy is an
effective alternative, while controlling for continent fixed effects.
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4. Results
4.1. Main Specification
We estimated the negative binomial model using STATA version 13. Table 4
displays the results of our model. We estimated four variations of the model by
adding one set of variables at a time, where all specifications include the dummy
variables controlling for standards and continents. In column (1), we present
a base specification that includes our three core variables (certification bodies,
distance, and GDP).10 The effects are all statistically significant (at the 5% default
level or better) with the expected signs. The number of domestic certification
bodies and per capita GDP both have a positive effect on the adoption of food
safety certification. Such findings may help explain part of the wide adoption
of GlobalGAP. GlobalGAP has 153 certification bodies worldwide, the largest
of the standards studied here. In comparison, BRC has 88 certification bodies
worldwide. On the other hand, we found that the effect of distance to standard
holder has a negative impact on certification adoption. That is, countries prefer
adopting standards that are based in nearby countries. One might wonder if the
result is driven by cheaper input (less travel cost to invite certifiers from the home
country and less cost for producers to learn about the standard) or a higher
volume of exports to nearby countries. Because we specifically control for the
latter, the result is likely driven by the former reason. This result indicates that
geography helps create product differentiations and provides market power to
the standard holders (e.g., PrimusGFS and SQF’s dominance in North America
and GlobalGAP’s success in Europe).
In column (2) we added total food exports plus the breakdown by export
destinations. The three core variables remain statistically significant. We found
total food exports had a positive impact on certification adoption. Such a result
is consistent with the view that higher food exports can create larger demand
for food safety certification. On one hand, importer requirements may force
countries to use certifiers. On the other hand, exporters may use certification
to create a competitive advantage for certain agricultural products. As to the
export destinations, this specification shows that higher proportions of food
exports to North America or to Asia increased the demand for certification.
Surprisingly, the proportion of food exports to Europe was not found to be
statistically significant. This seems at odds with previous studies that highlighted
the importance of international private retailers (e.g., in Europe) in driving the
adoption of certification in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (e.g., Reardon et
al., 2003). Several reasons could contribute to this finding. First, continent fixed
effects may already have picked up some of the regional variations in certification
numbers. Second, some U.S. retailers (e.g., Wal-Mart in 2008) were the first to
10 All the continent fixed effects and four of the five dummy variables controlling for standards are
statistically significant, highlighting the importance of controlling for these effects.
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Table 4. Estimation Results using the Negative Binomial Model
Dependent Variable:
Number of Certified
Sites
(1) Core
Variables
(2) Trade
Destina-
tions
(3) Trade
Products
(4) Both
Trade
Effects
(5) Full
Control
Variables
Number of 0.519∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
certification bodies (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Distance to standard −0.302∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ − 0.229∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗
holder’s country
(1,000 km)
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Per capita GDP 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.002
($1,000) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Proportion of food 0.25 −0.065 0.203
exports to EU (0.78) (0.80) (0.79)
Proportion of food 9.290∗∗∗ 8.732∗∗∗ 5.429∗∗∗
exports to NA (1.14) (1.16) (1.44)
Proportion of food 3.579∗ 3.751∗ 2.716
exports to SA (1.96) (2.00) (1.90)
Proportion of food 2.488∗∗∗ 2.243∗∗ 0.986
exports to Asia (0.83) (0.92) (0.95)
Proportion of food 0.649 0.215 −0.061
exports to Africa (0.93) (0.97) (0.93)
Total food exports 0.057∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
($1 million) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Proportion of meat − 1.337 0.523 −1.007
exports (1.07) (1.09) (1.03)
Proportion of fish 0.575 0.764 0.319
exports (0.61) (0.57) (0.58)
Proportion of 1.848∗∗∗ 1.123∗∗ 0.283
vegetable and fruit
exports
(0.59) (0.52) (0.53)
Proportion of urban 1.857∗∗∗
population (0.58)
Agricultural land size 0.534∗∗∗
(million km2) (0.16)
Common language −0.113
(0.27)
Colonial relationship 0.594∗
(0.33)
Contiguous border 2.438∗∗∗
(0.75)
Landlocked country −0.600∗∗
(0.26)
lnAlpha 1.602∗∗∗ 1.405∗∗∗ 1.505∗∗∗ 1.392∗∗∗ 1.304∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Log likelihood −2,872.56 −2,799.90 −2,807.89 −2,764.83 −2,738.16
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11
N 786 786 780 780 780
Notes: *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates of dummy
variables for continents and standards are suppressed. EU, NA, and SA denote European Union, North
America, and South America, respectively.
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require that all private brand suppliers become certified to one of the major
food safety standards. In addition, the new FSMA signed into law in 2011
provides the FDA with the authority to require that high-risk imported foods
be accompanied by a credible food safety certification. Though still not yet in
effect at the time these data were collected, expectation of such policy also helps
explain the significant impact of export proportion to North America.11
Column (3) differs from column (2) in that food export shares by product type
replaced food export shares by destination. The coefficient of the proportion of
vegetables and fruits exported is positive and statistically significant. Column
(4) combined the specifications in the previous two columns. Results changed
little from the previous two specifications. Finally, based on column (4), column
(5) includes the additional set of control variables such as agricultural land size
and colonial relationship. It is interesting to note that when the proportion of
urban population was included, its effect was positive and statistically significant,
whereas GDP and export shares of meat, fish, and vegetables and fruits became
statistically insignificant. This likely tells us that the domestic middle class is
more important in explaining the demand for certifications than is economic
development. One caveat of this finding is that the urban population proportion
and GDP have a correlation of 0.62. In this full specification, the effects of
certifiers and distance remain very robust.
As to trade, two variables remain robust: total food exports and the proportion
of food exports to North America. We found that agricultural land size
had a positive impact on certification adoption, which is consistent with our
expectation. Sharing a border with a standard holder increased a country’s
demand for that standard. Being a landlocked country was linked to less demand
for certification, confirming our hypothesis. Language or colonial relationships
were not found to be statistically significant at the 5% level. One reason for the
insignificant language effect is that many standards have versions for different
languages.
The pseudo R2 gradually increased from 0.08 for column (1) to 0.11 for
column (5), which is reasonable for cross-sectional data. The improvement in
the log likelihood from column (1) to column (4) is significant, whereas the
improvement from column (4) to column (5) is much smaller, highlighting the
importance of including the trade-related variables. Table 4 also reports the
estimated value for the log of α, the overdispersion parameter, which is larger
than 1 in all specifications. The null hypothesis of equidispersion, that is, equal
conditional mean and variance, is conclusively rejected because α is statistically
significant. Such a result justifies the use of the negative binomial model over the
Poisson model.
11 North America and Europe also have different phytosanitary restrictions. If exporters have had a
long history supplying Europe (colonial relationships), then they may long ago have adapted to European
standards. In this case, higher food exports to Europe are not likely to induce higher adoption of standards.
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Overall, a comparison of the five specifications shows that the main factors
affecting a country’s adoption of food safety certifications are the availability of
domestic certification bodies, distance to standard holder’s country, the degree of
urbanization, land endowment, total food export value, and the weight of trade
to North America. The first column of Table 5 reports the marginal effects based
on the estimates in column (5) of Table 4, the full estimates. We found that an
increase of one domestic certification body increased the number certified sites
by 3.9; an increase of 1,000 km in distance to the standard holder reduced 1.5
certified sites; a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of urban population
increased 0.3 certified sites; a $1 million increase in total food exports increased
0.6 certified sites; a 1 percentage point increase in the food export proportion
to North America increased 0.8 certified sites; an increase of 1 million km2 in
agricultural land increased 7.3 certified sites; sharing a border with the standard
holder increased 33.3 certified sites; and being a landlocked country reduced 8.2
sites.
4.2. Some Robustness Checks
We further estimated several subsamples to examine the robustness of our results
to different combinations of the standards. All results are based on the full
specification in Table 4. Results are reported in Table 5. In the first robustness
check (column 2), we combined the proportions of food exports to the European
Union and North America. The logic is that when these two are separate,
they may crowd out the effect of each other. The combined variable is not
statistically significant. In the second check, we excluded GlobalGAP for two
reasons. First, the scale of its adoption is about 10 times that for the other
standards (Tables 1 and 2). So it is possible that the results are largely driven
by the pattern of GlobalGAP adoption. Second, GlobalGAP is the only standard
that exclusively focuses on farming. All the other six standards can be applied
to food manufacturing and processing. Column (3) of Table 5 reports the results
for this specification.
In the third robustness check, we broke the sample into farming standards
(GlobalGAP, PrimusGFS, and SQF) versus exclusive manufacturing/processing
standards (BRC, FSSC 22000, and ISO 22000) to investigate whether the
adoption process is different between farming and manufacturing/processing
standards. The last two columns of Table 5 report the findings. Several findings
emerge from the last two robustness checks. First, the number of certification
bodies, exports to North America, total food exports, and urban population
remain very robust. Second, it seems distance matters for adopting farming-
related standards but not for manufacturing standards. The distance parameter
is significant at the 10% level in the farming standard specification. It becomes
insignificant when GlobalGAP was excluded and turns positive and in the
manufacturing standard specification. Third, interestingly we found that the
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/aae.2017.2
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 128.163.8.74, on 12 Apr 2018 at 22:16:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
318 REZGAR MOHAMMED AND YUQING ZHENG
Table 5.Marginal Effects plus Some Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable:
Number of Certified
Sites
(1) Marginal
Effects
(2)
Combined
EU and NA
(3) Global-
GAP
Excluded
(4) Farming
Standards
(5) Manu-
facturing
Standards
Number of 3.893∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
certification bodies (0.05) (0.05) (0.23) (0.03)
Distance to standard −1.526∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.024 −0.152∗ 0.077∗∗
holder’s country
(1,000 km)
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04)
Per capita GDP 0.033 0.008 0.005 −0.014 0.00
($1,000) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Proportion of food 0.795
exports to EU and
NA
(0.76)
Proportion of food 2.782 0.415 0.13 0.849
exports to EU (0.80) (2.24) (0.66)
Proportion of food 74.221∗∗∗ 3.770∗∗∗ 8.745∗∗ 2.438∗∗
exports to NA (1.32) (3.58) (1.08)
Proportion of food 37.137 −0.413 2.808 −3.614 4.598∗∗∗
exports to SA (1.48) (1.89) (5.30) (1.70)
Proportion of food 13.481 0.623 1.044 2.41 0.086
exports to Asia (0.96) (0.94) (2.51) (0.74)
Proportion of food −0.839 0.017 −0.106 −0.422 0.078
exports to Africa (0.94) (0.93) (2.34) (0.82)
Total food exports 0.556∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
($1 million) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Proportion of meat −13.771 −1.474 −1.053 −0.635 −0.939
exports (1.01) (1.06) (3.21) (0.88)
Proportion of fish 4.358 0.171 −0.01 3.167∗∗ −1.055∗∗
exports (0.60) (0.58) (1.54) (0.42)
Proportion of 3.872 0.463 0.254 0.618 0.675
vegetable and fruit
exports
(0.53) (0.53) (1.26) (0.45)
Proportion of urban 25.389∗∗∗ 1.625∗∗∗ 1.928∗∗∗ 3.883∗∗∗ 0.835∗
population (0.59) (0.58) (1.47) (0.51)
Agricultural land size 7.298∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.482 0.332∗∗
(million km2) (0.16) (0.16) (0.35) (0.14)
Common language −1.549 −0.247 −0.14 0.341 −0.079
(0.27) (0.29) (0.58) (0.27)
Colonial relationship 8.115∗ 0.638∗ 0.579∗ −0.767 0.733∗∗
(0.33) (0.33) (0.97) (0.31)
Contiguous border 33.335∗∗∗ 4.224∗∗∗ 0.953 0.949 −0.027
(0.62) (0.65) (1.66) (0.61)
Landlocked country −8.199∗∗ −0.742∗∗∗ −0.726∗∗∗ 0.074 −0.981∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.26) (0.62) (0.23)
lnAlpha 1.325∗∗∗ 1.218∗∗∗ 1.981∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07)
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Table 5. Continued
Dependent Variable:
Number of Certified
Sites
(1) Marginal
Effects
(2)
Combined
EU and NA
(3) Global-
GAP
Excluded
(4) Farming
Standards
(5) Manu-
facturing
Standards
Log likelihood −2,745.75 −2,650.05 − 910.05 −1,691.60
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.11
N 780 650 390 390
Notes: *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates of dummy
variables for continents and standards are suppressed. EU, NA, and SA denote European Union, North
America, and South America, respectively. Farming standards are GlobalGAP (Global Good Agricultural
Practices), PrimusGFS (developed by PrimusLab as a Global Food Safety Initiative variant), and SQF (Safe
Quality Food). Exclusive manufacturing standards are BRC (British Retail Consortium Food Standard),
FSSC 22000 (Food Safety System Certification 22000), and ISO 22000 (International Organization for
Standardization 22000).
proportion of fish exports is positive in the farming standard specification and
negative in the manufacturing standard specification.
5. Conclusion
We examined the cross-national adoption of private food safety standards,
focusing on the role of certifiers and international trade. Applying a negative
binomial model to pooled cross-sectional data for 131 countries over six major
standards, we obtained several results that might have important policy and
marketing implications. First, we found that distance to the standard holder will
negatively affect the number of certified sites in a country to that standard. Such
effect particularly holds for adopting farming-related standards. In other words,
distance created product differentiation for standards. Meanwhile, per capita
GDP has a positive impact on a country’s certification adoption. The entire major
private food safety standards are either based in the United States or Europe.
Developing countries in Africa and Asia clearly are at a disadvantage in adopting
food safety standards because they are farther away from the standard holders
(likely faced with a higher certification cost).
From the perspectives of development and food safety, what can we do to
accelerate the adoption of food safety certification in developing countries (given
that there is not much we can change about GDP or urbanization)? One policy
recommendation, based on our finding of the negative relationship between
distance and certification adoption, is to create a competing food safety standard
that is based in a developing country in Africa and/or Asia. However, given
that there are already a handful of well-established standards in the market,
establishing a new competing standard seems difficult. A better and more cost-
effective alternative is to provide developing countries with better access to the
existing standards. We found that the number of domestic certification bodies
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had a positive and very robust effect on a country’s adoption of food safety
standards. In fact, the marginal effects show that an increase of one domestic
certification body increased the number certified sites by 3.9, which is equivalent
to the effect of a 15 percentage point increase in the proportion of population
in urban areas. One such recommendation is to provide certification training
programs for distant developing countries (from the standard holders) and/or
training students coming from those countries in developed countries.
Second, we found total food exports had a positive impact on a country’s
certification adoption, likely because of importers’ requirements and/or
exporters’ strategy of using certification to gain market access. We also found
that in additional to the total size of food exports, the composition of exporting
partners matters. In particular, a higher proportion of food exports to North
America increased the demand for certification, suggesting that probably North
America has the strongest demand or requirements for food safety certification.
Because the data we used were before the full implementation of the FSMA, likely
the buyers’ demand from the private sector (e.g., U.S. retailers) largely drove our
results. The full implementation of the FSMA likely will strengthen this effect.
Future studies may want to further analyze the impact of the export shares of
processed and unprocessed food as well.Wewant to emphasize two areas that are
worth exploring further.One is the producer’s choice of which standard to certify
to. The other is how much the certification cost, which is paid by producers, is
passed through to consumers in the form of a price increase. Finally, one caveat
of our study is the use of cross-sectional data. Future studies in this area are
encouraged to employ panel data. First, panel data will make good use of the
explosive increase in certified sites in recent years (a great source of variation).
Second, panel data will allow researchers to better test for the causal connection
between certification and trade, as well as to build a full structural model that
examines not only the impact of trade on certification adoption (e.g., using lagged
variable), but also how certification improves trade. Our study only focuses on
the former issue, by assuming exogeneity of trade.
References
Asfaw, S., D. Mithöfer, and H. Waibel. “Agrifood Supply Chain, Private-Sector Standards,
and Farmers’ Health: Evidence from Kenya.” Agricultural Economics 41(February
2010):251–63.
———. “Investment in Compliance with GlobalGAP Standards: Does It Pay Off for Small-
Scale Producers in Kenya?”Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture 48(January
2009):337–62.
Barrett, H.R., A.W. Browne, P.J.C. Harris, and K. Cadoret. “Organic Certification and the UK
Market: Organic Imports from Developing Countries.”Food Policy 27(July 2002):301–
18.
Global Food Safety Initiative. “Recognised Schemes.” Internet site: http://www.mygfsi.com/
schemes-certification/recognised-schemes.html (Accessed April 1, 2015).
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/aae.2017.2
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 128.163.8.74, on 12 Apr 2018 at 22:16:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
Diffusion of Food Safety Standards 321
Greene, W.H. Econometric Analysis. 7th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2012.
Hatanaka, M., C. Bain, and L. Busch. “Third-Party Certification in the Global Agrifood
System.” Food Policy 30(June 2005):354–69.
Henson, S.,O.Masakure, and J.Cranfield. “Do Fresh Produce Exporters in Sub-Saharan Africa
Benefit from GlobalGAP Certification?”World Development 39(March 2011):375–86.
Herzfeld, T., L.S. Drescher, and C. Grebitus. “Cross-National Adoption of Private Food
Quality Standards.” Food Policy 36(June 2011):401–11.
Holzapfel, S., andM.Wollni. “Is GlobalGAP Certification of Small-Scale Farmers Sustainable?
Evidence from Thailand.” Journal of Development Studies 50(February 2014):731–47.
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). “ISO Survey of Certifications.” Internet
site: http://www.iso.org/iso/iso-survey (Accessed December 31, 2013).
Jongwanich, J. “The Impact of Food Safety Standards on Processed Food Exports from
Developing Countries.” Food Policy 34(October 2009):447–57.
Kanter, C., K.D. Messer, and H.M. Kaiser. “Does Production Labeling Stigmatize
Conventional Milk?” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 91(November
2009):1097–109.
Kariuki, I.M., J.P. Loy, and T. Herzfeld. “Farmgate Private Standards and Price Premium:
Evidence from the GlobalGAP Scheme in Kenya’s French Beans Marketing.”
Agribusiness: An International Journal 28(April 2012):42–53.
Liaukonyte, J., N.A. Streletskaya, H.M. Kaiser, and B. Rickard. “Consumer Response to
‘Contains’ and ‘Free of’ Labeling: Evidence from Lab Experiments.”Applied Economic
Perspectives and Policy 35(June 2013):476–507.
Lim, K.H., W. Hu, L.J. Maynard, and E. Goddard. “A Taste for Safer Beef? How Much Does
Consumers’ Perceived Risk Influence Willingness to Pay for Country-of-Origin Labeled
Beef.”Agribusiness: An International Journal 30(January 2014):17–30.
Loureiro, M.L., and W.J. Umberger. “A Choice Experiment Model for Beef: What US
Consumer Responses Tell Us about Relative Preferences for Food Safety, Country-of-
Origin Labeling and Traceability.” Food Policy 32(August 2007):496–514.
Mayer, T., and S. Zignago. “Notes on CEPII’s Distances Measures: The GeoDist Database.”
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) Working Paper
No. 2011-25, Paris: CEPII, 2011.
McCluskey, J.J., and M.L. Loureiro. “Consumer Preferences and Willingness to Pay for Food
Labeling: A Discussion of Empirical Studies.” Journal of Food Distribution Research
34(November 2003):95–102.
Meas, T., W. Hu, M. Batte, T. Woods, and S. Ernst. “Substitutes or Complements? Consumer
Preferences for Local and Organic Food Attributes.” American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 97(July 2015):1044–71.
Neumayer, E., and R. Perkins. “Uneven Geographies of Organizational Practice: Explaining
the Cross-National Transfer and Diffusion of ISO 9000.”Economic Geography 81(July
2005):237–59.
Otsuki, T., J. Wilson, and M. Sewadeh. “Saving Two in a Billion: Quantifying the Trade
Effect of European Food Safety Standards on African Exports.”Food Policy 26(October
2001a):495–514.
———. “What Price Precaution? European Harmonisation of Aflatoxin Regulations and
African Groundnut Exports.”European Review of Agricultural Economics 28(October
2001b):263–84.
Peterson, E., J. Grant, D. Roberts, and V. Karov. “Evaluating the Trade Restrictiveness of
Phytosanitary Measures on U.S. Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Imports. American Journal
of Agricultural Economics 95(July 2013):842–58.
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/aae.2017.2
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 128.163.8.74, on 12 Apr 2018 at 22:16:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
322 REZGAR MOHAMMED AND YUQING ZHENG
Reardon, T., C.P. Timmer, C.B. Barrett, and J. Berdegué. “The Rise of Supermarkets in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85(December
2003):1140–46.
Runge, C.F., and L.A. Jackson. “Negative Labeling of Genetically Modified Organisms
(GMOs): The Experience of rBST.”AgBioForum 3,1(2000):58–62.
Subervie, J., and I.Vagneron. “ADrop ofWater in the IndianOcean? The Impact of GlobalGap
Certification on Lychee Farmers in Madagascar.” World Development 50(October
2013):57–73.
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). Internet site: http://
comtrade.un.org/db/ (Accessed January 2, 2015).
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service. “Recall
Case Archive.” Internet site: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/
recalls-and-public-health-alerts/recall-case-archive (Accessed May 1, 2015).
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. “Accreditation of Third-Party Certification Bodies to
Conduct Food Safety Audits and to Issue Certifications, Final Regulatory Impact
Analysis.” Federal Register 80,228(2011):74569–74667.
———. “Archive for Recalls,Market Withdrawals & Safety Alerts.” Internet site: http://www.
fda.gov/safety/recalls/archiverecalls/default.htm (Accessed May 1, 2015).
The World Bank. “World Development Indicators.” Internet site: http://data.worldbank.org/
data-catalog/world-development-indicators (Accessed December 31, 2013).
Zheng, Y., M.K. Muth, and J. Brophy. “The Impact of Food Safety Third-Party Certifications
on China’s Food Exports to the United States.” Paper presented at the Agricultural and
Applied Economics Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, August 4–6, 2013.
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/aae.2017.2
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 128.163.8.74, on 12 Apr 2018 at 22:16:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
